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Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law,
Or, Is Jack Balkin Heartbreaking?

Andrew Koppelman *

ELLIE [raising her head]. Damn!
MRS HUSHABYE. Splendid! Oh, what a relief! I thought you
were going to be broken-hearted. Never mind me. Damn him
again.
ELLIE. I am not damning him. I am damning myself for being
such a fool. [Rising]. How could I let myself be taken in
so? [She begins prowling to and fro, her bloom gone,
looking curiously older and harder].
MRS HUSHABYE [cheerfully]. Why not, pettikins? Very few
young women can resist Hector. I couldn't when I was your
age. He is really rather splendid, you know.
ELLIE [turning on her]. Splendid! Yes, splendid looking, of
course. But how can you love a liar?
MRS HUSHABYE. I don't know. But you can, fortunately.
Otherwise there wouldn't be much love in the world. 1
How many constitutions have we? Part of what we hope for
from Constitutional Law is that we be united, despite our
political differences, by a unifying political charter. John
Rawls speaks for many when he writes that a well-ordered society
“is a society all of whose members accept, and know that the
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others accept, the same principles (the same conception) of
justice.” 2
Jack Balkin argues that we have to give up on the Rawlsian
aspiration, and learn to live in a world where, at a fundamental
level, our fellow citizens are strange to us. This is bound to
try our faith in the regime. Perhaps America is not what I
thought it was. Perhaps our marriage has always been a lie. We
must learn to live with heartbreak.
I.
I begin with a sordid tale of betrayal. When the Supreme
Court agreed to take the case of Bush v. Gore, 3 I was less
concerned about the outcome than many of my friends who had
voted for Gore. These judges aren’t crazy or evil, I said.
They are decent, intelligent people who happen to have different
political views than we do. They understand perfectly well that
the worst possible outcome, one to be avoided at all costs, is a
5-4 decision, with the majority consisting entirely of
Republicans, thwarting the counting of votes and handing the
Presidency to a man who lost the popular vote. They understand
that the Constitution provides a detailed procedure for
selecting the President, and does not authorize the Supreme
Court to simply pick the President that it likes. That kind of
abuse of the judicial office would be so obvious and egregious
that the majority judges would be disgraced, perhaps even
impeached. These are conscientious people doing their best to
follow the law.
So much for my good judgment. My sense of betrayal was
compounded when many of my fellow law professors, all of whom
just happened to be loyal Republicans, rushed to devise
legitimizing rationales, rationales that were pathetically thin,
for the Court’s decisions. It was obvious what they (and, for
that matter, the judges in the majority) would have said had the
Court engaged in such contortions on behalf of Democrats.
Betrayal presupposes trust. The whole business would have
been different had I regarded these judges and their supporters
as subhuman or mad. I felt betrayed because I thought that we
had shared norms that went beyond our political differences.
What’s more disheartening is that they actually believe their
silly arguments, and continue to believe them to this day, long
after the political stakes have dissipated.
Balkin sheds useful light on this sorry episode. He offers
a useful, albeit discouraging, anatomy of how it happens that
2
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our fellow citizens, whom we thought had shared common norms,
could turn out to have allegiances that are entirely foreign to
us.
His argument begins with Frank Michelman’s revision of
Rawls. Michelman does not agree that legitimacy depends on
everyone in society sharing the same conception of justice. On
the contrary, legitimacy is possible even if there is
substantial disagreement about constitutional essentials. The
American tendency to identify the Constitution with one’s own
aspirations inevitably produces a multiplicity of readings.
Everyone in the political community offers their own
interpretation of the Constitution, one that interprets the
system as conforming with their own visions of democracy and
justice. Those aspects of the regime that do not so conform can
be regarded as mistakes that can be corrected. Each member of
the community can read the Constitution with interpretive
charity, believing or hoping that these mistakes will be
corrected in the fullness of time. 4
Balkin emphasizes the variety this authorizes, in a more
inflammatory way than Michelman:
Now, different people in the political community will have
different notions of what those mistakes would be. That is
because different people will have different notions of the
best interpretation of the Constitution and current
practices. So one person might regard the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade as a terrible mistake that will
someday be corrected, or as a demerit against an otherwise
respect-worthy system, and will interpret the scope of the
Roe decision and the principles announced in it very
narrowly so that it does as little harm as possible.
Another person will regard Roe v. Wade as an important
reason why the system is respect-worthy—because it secures
equality for women—and will interpret the decision and its
principles robustly. As a result, there might be a large
number of different portraits of the Constitution and the
governmental system. 5
What unites citizens, then, is “a common commitment to a common
object of interpretation whose actual content, in turn, is
contested.” 6
Balkin emphasizes that this is not an invitation to
anarchy. Rather, constitutional dissensus “may actually help
4
Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental
System, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 345 (2003).
5
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust
World 42 (2011).
6
Id. at 43. The meaning of the canonical cases of Constitutional law is
similarly protean. Id. at 206.
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promote and secure social cooperation and the goods of union.” 7
The unknowability of the future means that each of us can
construct our own hopeful narrative about the direction of the
polity. And our hope is reinforced if there is some way we can
imagine that our story about the system’s history can prevail.
Constitutional politics in America is conducted by means of a
clash of narratives of the American past, in which different
social movements compete to make their views canonical.
These narratives about national identity certainly do the
work that Balkin says that they do. Here, as elsewhere, 8
however, the news he is delivering may prove difficult to
digest.
It is comforting to know that our faith at least has a
common object. But do we know that? Balkin borrows Sanford
Levinson’s metaphor of constitutional Protestantism, 9 but
Protestantism’s model of diversity is hub and spoke: manifold
perceptions united by the fact that there really is only one
God. All Protestants worship the same God, and they have faith
that it’s the same God.
The historian Arthur Lovejoy long ago made the
disconcerting suggestion that the term “Christianity” is “not
the name for any single unit of the type for which the historian
of specific ideas looks.” Rather, the history of Christianity
is “a series of facts which, taken as a whole, have almost
nothing in common except the name.” All Christians have held in
common “the reverence for a certain person,” but Jesus Christ’s
“nature and teaching . . . have been most variously conceived,
so that the unity here too is largely a unity of name.” 10
Jaroslav Pelikan responds that there is continuity as well as
discontinuity (in a study that emphasizes the discontinuities
over two millennia): “Yet Lovejoy would also have been obliged
to acknowledge that each of the almost infinite – and infinitely
different – ways of construing that name has been able to claim
some warrant or other somewhere within the original portrait (or
portraits) of Jesus in the Gospels.” 11 This, however, is a
pretty faint continuity compared with the claim in the Epistle
to the Hebrews: “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today
and for ever. Do not be led away by diverse and strange
teachings.” 12
7
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The news that we have not in fact been worshipping the same
God is not minor news. Samuel Freeman observes that the
“overriding concern” of all of Rawls’s work “is to describe how,
if at all, a well-ordered society in which all agree on a public
conception of justice is realistically possible.” 13 Rawls
eventually acknowledged that there is “a family of reasonable
though differing liberal political conceptions.” 14 Even if
Rawls’s basic framework is accepted, “there are indefinitely
many considerations that may be appealed to in the original
position and each alternative conception of justice is favored
by some considerations and disfavored by others.” 15 Freeman, who
knew Rawls well, thinks that the concession that there will not
be general agreement on his own conception of justice, which he
called justice as fairness, “must have been an enormous
disappointment to him, for he had worked for nearly forty years
trying to show how a well-ordered society where everyone accepts
justice as fairness as its public charter is a realistic
possibility.” 16
II.
LADY UTTERWORD. What an extraordinary way to behave! What
is the matter with the man?
ELLIE [in a strangely calm voice, staring into an imaginary
distance]. His heart is breaking: that is all. . . . It is
a curious sensation: the sort of pain that goes mercifully
beyond our powers of feeling. When your heart is broken,
your boats are burned: nothing matters any more. It is the
end of happiness and the beginning of peace. 17
To understand why Rawls was so disappointed, consider some
recent work in moral philosophy about the structure of
respectful relations between human beings. Steven Darwall
observes that we inevitably make moral claims upon one another,
and offers a philosophical analysis of this practice. Darwall
seeks to address, not the practical problems of a pluralistic
society, but some specialized, albeit important, questions of
metaethics, having to do with what kind of entity a moral claim
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Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian
Political Philosophy 4 (2007).
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John Rawls, Political Liberalism xxxviii (expanded ed. 1996). See also The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Collected Papers at 582.
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is. 18 But he sheds light on Rawls’s problem. We strive for
respectful relations, but we can’t achieve them without a
specific common object of agreement. The idea of respect is too
fluid, and takes too many possible forms, to ground any but the
most trivial specific moral claims.
Darwall argues that the foundation of morality is what he
calls “the second-person standpoint,” “the perspective you and I
take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s
conduct and will.” 19 The practice of making claims upon others,
a practice that Darwall thinks inseparable from human agency,
has other pertinent presuppositions: that persons regard one
another as free and rational, that addressees can freely and
rationally accept the reasons that are given (and any authority
relations in which they are grounded), that legitimate demands
are distinct from mere coercion, and that addresser and
addressee share a common authority to make claims on one
another. The practice of making claims therefore also
presupposes autonomy of the will and the common basic dignity of
persons. 20
Darwall’s account of the pragmatic presuppositions of the
making of claims is powerful but vague. These presuppositions
are demanding:
[W]e hold ourselves morally accountable to others when we
impose demands on ourselves that we think it sensible to
impose on anyone from a perspective that we all can share
as free (second-personally competent) and rational. And we
presuppose that anyone we hold thus accountable is someone
who can in principle also accept and impose these same
demands on himself by taking up this impartial secondperson perspective and seeing the sense of imposing them on
anyone. 21
Darwall says little about the content of these demands. They
cannot be inconsistent with the common basic dignity of persons,
but there are plenty of mutually inconsistent norms that satisfy
that minimal requirement. It is satisfied, for example, when I
tell the waiter that I want the Eggs Benedict. 22 So long as you
and I agree about the norms to which we are bound, and those
norms are not inconsistent with the autonomy and dignity of
18

These are the focus of a symposium on Darwall’s book in 118 Ethics (Oct.
2007).
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Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint 3 (2006).
20
See especially id. at 269-76, summarizing themes developed throughout the
book.
21
Id. at 276.
22
Id. at 51. The illustration, which is Darwall’s, is revealing, since the
relationship between waiter and customer is typically one of dramatically
asymmetrical power, at least when the tip is not automatically added to the
bill. Thanks to Bonnie Honig for this point.
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either of us, we can stand in respectful relations with one
another regardless of the content of our claims.
The norms in question need not be lawlike. They need not
be formulable in terms of universal principles. 23 Moreover,
“nothing in the idea of moral obligation as involving reciprocal
accountability rules out its scope or content extending beyond
the needs and interests of free and rational individuals
considered as such.” 24 Our moral obligations “might include, for
example, the protection of cultural treasures, wilderness,
and/or the welfare of other sentient beings, quite independently
of the relation any of these have to the interests of free and
rational persons.” 25
Darwall’s argument has important implications for Rawls’s
aspiration for “a society all of whose members accept, and know
that the others accept, the same principles (the same
conception) of justice.” 26 The principles of justice that Rawls
outlines can indeed be the objects of overlapping consensus, and
so be the basis of respectful relations that are more than a
mere modus vivendi. But so, Darwall has shown, can any other
shared normative criteria.
So long as we manage to agree on a standard by which we can
legitimately make claims upon one another, the basis of mutual
respect could be the norms of well-run restaurants, the divine
right of kings, the supreme authority of the Church, or the
rules of football. There is probably an infinite number of ways
in which the norms that are the basis of respectful relations
could be formulated, and an infinite number of ways in which
those formulations could be interpreted in specific cases.
Respect is, in short, fluid. 27
23

They can, for example, be the particularistic judgments that Jonathan Dancy
thinks constitute moral reasoning, see Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without
Principles (2004), so long as they are able to be publicly articulated and
accessible. See Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint, at 156, 313-14. Many
particular judgments, not derived from rules, are publicly accessible and
verifiable: e.g., “the sky is blue.”
24
Id. at 28.
25
Id. There are, concededly, passages in which Darwall appears to have more
Kantian aspirations, seeking to ground “principles that we and [others] could
will . . . as universal law” (308) or “principles that are acceptable, or not
reasonably rejectable, to each as free and rational agents” (300). But these
claims sit uneasily beside the concessions to a more contingent ethics cited
in the text. Thanks to Sam Fleischacker for pointing out these passages.
26
Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, at 255.
27
The dictionary definition of “fluid” applies here: “A substance that
exists, or is regarded as existing, as a continuum characterized by low
resistance to flow and the tendency to assume the shape of the container.”
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 505 (1976). I develop a
similar point about neutrality in The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF
POLITICS 633 (2004).
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The second-person standpoint, Darwall observes, is not even
incompatible with slavery, so long as the slaveholder believes
that his slaves can be expected rationally to endorse his claim
of authority over them. Slaveholders have in fact believed
this. 28 The implausibility of their reasons for so believing is
not deducible from respect as such. When the Athenians tried to
explain to the Melians that the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must, they manifested respect of the
Darwallian sort. 29 Intelligent arguments against democratic
government are of ancient vintage, and rebutting them depends on
contingent empirical claims. 30
Darwall’s analysis implies that the role of shared norms in
relations of mutual respect is analogous to the role of the
sovereign in Hobbes’s Leviathan. Hobbes thinks that in a wellfunctioning state there must be a sovereign and the sovereign
must possess supreme authority. But this entails very little
28

The Second Person Standpoint, 268.
See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book 5. There are limits to what
can be said in this way without embarrassment. Rudolph Hoess, who was in
charge of Auschwitz, did not, when challenged by his victims, attempt to
defend his deeds to them, though their reproaches clearly made an impression
upon him. Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz: The Autobiography of
Rudolf Hoess 144 (1959). On the other hand, the following story, recounted
by Franz Stangl, the commandant of Treblinka, suggests that some people are
incapable of embarrassment:
There was one day when [Blau, a Jew who was kept alive and used as a
cook, whom Stangl described as “the one I talked to most”] knocked at
the door of my office about mid-morning and asked permission to speak
to me. He looked very worried. I said, “Of course, Blau, come on in.
What’s worrying you?” He said it was his eighty-year-old father; he’d
arrived on that morning’s transport. Was there anything I could do. I
said, “Really, Blau, you must understand, it’s impossible. A man of
eighty . . .” He said quickly that yes, he understood, of course. But
could he ask me or permission to take his father to the Lazarett [the
fake hospital, where the old and sick were shot rather than gassed]
rather than the gas chambers. And could he take his father first to
the kitchen and give him a meal. I said, “You go and do what you think
best, Blau. Officially I don’t know anything, but unofficially you can
tell the Kapo I said it was all right.” In the afternoon, when I came
back to my office, he was waiting for me. He had tears in his eyes.
He stood to attention and said, “Herr Hauptsturmfuhrer, I want to thank
you. I gave my father a meal. And I’ve just taken him to the Lazarett
– it’s all over. Thank you very much.” I said, “Well, Blau, there’s
no need to thank me, but of course if you want to thank me, you may.”
Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder 207-8
(1974); on the Lazarett, see id. at 165. Stangl evidently supposed that he
and Blau shared respect of the Darwallian kind. An entire social world
supported that supposition. What was off-the-wall, in that context, was the
suggestion that Stangl might refrain from murdering the father of a man with
whom he was friendly. The real thoughts of Blau (who did not survive the
camps, see id. at 209) are unknowable.
30
See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (1991).
29
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about who that sovereign ought to be. Darwall shows that there
must be shared norms. But this entails very little about what
those norms ought to be.
The fluidity of respect helps explain why, in a 320 page
monograph on moral philosophy, Darwall does not offer a single
example of how the standpoint he is defending can help to
resolve an actual moral problem. What he does show is the
ubiquity of the second person standpoint. Notably, it dominates
“conversations in which participants display their reactions to
others’ actions and feelings.” 31 In such conversations, “people
negotiate questions of how it makes sense to respond to what
people do and what norms for evaluating conduct it makes most
sense to accept.” 32 But if “much of what human beings discuss
concerns what they and we can warrantedly expect and demand of
one another,” 33 then it should be obvious that these discussions
go considerably beyond the interests of free and rational
persons as such, to an enormous range of other normative
considerations. All of this discussion is necessary because the
answers are not obvious. Of course, this broadens the range and
the stakes of possible disagreement.
Darwall’s analysis of respect sheds light on the problem of
pluralism that so concerns Rawls. Uncertainty about the
specifics of shared norms can give rise to a distinctive form of
conflict, and helps account for the intensity of that kind of
conflict.
In order for you and I to exist in respectful relation to
one another, Darwall shows, we must acknowledge a common norm.
But then, if you challenge (or misinterpret!) a presently
prevailing norm, or one the authority of which is obvious to me,
and it is not apparent to me that you can offer a norm that can
adequately replace it, then you are denying (or so it may appear
to me) the very possibility of respectful relations between us. 34
III.
HUNDING:

Ich weiss ein wildes Geschlecht,

31

The Second Person Standpoint, 170.
Id.
33
Id. at 171.
34
Compare Clifford Geertz:
Hardly anyone, even a marriage closer or a probate judge, is ready to
die for pure procedure. What is at risk, or felt to be, are the
conceptions of fact and law themselves and of the relations they bear
the one to the other – the sense, without which human beings can hardly
live at all, much less adjudicate anything, that truth, vice,
falsehood, and virtue are real, distinguishable, and appropriately
aligned.
Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 231 (2000).
32
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Nicht heilig ist ihm was andren hehr:
Verhasst ist es allen und mir.
[I know of a savage race,
It does not hold holy what others revere:
It is hated by all and me.] 35
Hunding’s logic makes sense. Not holding holy what others
revere makes one a savage. It is a kind of treason against the
moral order. Hunding’s error consists in his thinking that the
moral order with which he is familiar is the only possible moral
order. As in Hobbes, the sovereign’s identity is less important
than his undisputed authority.
Darwall observes that “when second-personal reasons are
offered, issues of respect are invariably at stake. If the
private fails to heed the sergeant’s orders, he doesn’t simply
act contrary to a reason that sheds favorable light; he violates
the order and so disrespects the sergeant and her authority.” 36
The appropriate reactive attitude is one that demands that the
violator acknowledge the authority that he has failed to
respect. Obviously, if the private persists in doubting that
the sergeant has the authority she claims, then they have a
problem. Respect between the sergeant and the private demands
that they acknowledge a common norm. Yet the idea of respect
between free and rational beings cannot tell them whether it is
appropriate to designate people as sergeants and privates at
all, or which is the sergeant and which the private, or what
demands a sergeant is or is not entitled to make of a private.
In that sense, respect is elusive, but in another, it is
readily available. All that is needed is some common basis for
claims. That doesn’t sound so hard. But the Balkin-Michelman
claim about the Constitution as a basis for social unity gives
rise to a puzzle: when everyone constructs their own private
Constitution, is there any common basis for the claims we make
upon one another?
Balkin thinks that what provides the necessary unity, in
modern America, is fidelity to the Constitution’s original
meaning.
Protestant constitutionalism needs something that gives
people something to rally around; something that is a
common object of interpretation even though everyone’s
interpretations of that object differ. Faith in a process
divorced from a central text may be altogether too abstract
to serve this function. 37
35
36
37

Richard Wagner, Die Walkure, Act I; my translation.
The Second Person Standpoint at 60.
Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, at 246.
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The text also provides us with a language for evaluating
proposals for social change. “Appeals to return and reform, to
the text as the symbol and site of these appeals, are the
standard way of engaging in protestant constitutional argument
in America’s democratic constitutional culture.” 38 The constant
generation of new rhetorics of return to the unpolluted source
of constitutional authority keeps the regime legitimate because
it makes the regime responsive to the needs of the time.
Given the proliferation of interpretations, however, how
can a text offer the necessary unity? As long ago as 1856, one
newspaper editor observed: “The Constitution threatens to be a
subject of infinite sects, like the Bible.” 39 Balkin writes that
the text symbolizes popular sovereignty precisely because its
public character “authorizes people from all walks of life to
claim the right to interpret it.” 40 Hobbes, on the contrary,
thinks we need a sovereign, not a unifying text, precisely
because a text is susceptible to too many different
interpretations. 41 His fear of chaos has contemporary echoes, 42
notably in many modern originalists’ search for the holy grail
of an interpretive method that leaves no room for judicial
discretion. 43
38

Id. at 234.
Quoted in Michael Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The
Constitution in American Culture 103 (1986).
40
Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, at 237.
41
Thus Hobbes’s reflection on the radical Protestant reliance on scripture
during the English Civil War:
after the Bible was translated into English, every man, nay, every boy
and wench, that could read English, thought they spoke with God
Almighty, and understood what he said, when by a certain number of
chapters a day they had read the Scriptures once or twice over. The
reverence and obedience due to the Reformed Church here, and to the
bishops and pastors therein, was cast off, and every man became a judge
of religion, and an interpreter of the Scriptures to himself. . . .
[T]his licence of interpreting the Scripture was the cause of so many
several sects, as have lain hid till the beginning of the late King’s
reign, and did then appear to the disturbance of the commonwealth.
Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, or, The Long Parliament 21-22 (Chicago 1990). The
inevitable fragmentation created by reliance on a written text is, perhaps,
the only point of agreement between Hobbes and Levinson. Compare
Constitutional Faith at 17.
42
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992)(plurality
opinion)(claiming that Americans’ “belief in themselves as [a people who live
according to the rule of law] is not readily separable from their
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their
constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional
ideals”).
43
Many modern originalists have abandoned the quest, though in its popular
versions originalism continues to advertise itself as providing this
constraint. See Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99
Georgetown L. J. 713 (2011).
39
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The fear of social division also underlies Rawls’s idea of
public reason as a basis for resolving the bewildering diversity
of comprehensive views. 44 The problem he faced, of how to cope
with religious diversity, sheds light on our problem, how to
cope with the diversity of constitutional interpretations. 45 In
his last writings, he conceded that, even with respect to
political fundamentals, citizens may present political arguments
based on their comprehensive views, “provided that in due course
public reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are
presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive
doctrines are introduced to support.” 46 There is no formula for
what “in due course” means; such matters must be worked out “in
practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of
rules given in advance.” 47 Rawls’s position thus converges with
that of Christopher Eberle: The religious citizen (whose
reasons, in Rawls, are paradigmatically nonpublic) can offer her
religiously based political views freely so long as she
continues to pursue a search for public reasons and thinks that
it will eventually be possible to provide them. 48 Public
discourse will thus inevitably include arguments that seem to
many citizens to be off the wall. But the imperatives of
44

“In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we
are not to appeal to comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines – to
what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole truth . .
. [C]itizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the
framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on
values that others can reasonably be expected to endorse.” Rawls, Political
Liberalism, at 225-6; for a fuller exposition of Rawls’s idea of public
reason, see Freeman, Rawls, at 381-415.
The term public reason was in fact coined by Hobbes, who understood it
rather differently:
we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience,
[the arbiter of moral and religious questions] but the Publique Reason,
that is, the reason of God's Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we
have made him Judge already, if wee have given him a Soveraign power,
to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 477-78 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968). Hobbes thought
that public reason could not serve its unifying function if everyone got to
interpret it for themselves.
45
The analogy with religion is particularly salient because, in the modern
nation-state, the imagined community is the object of quasi-religious
veneration. See William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence:
Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (2009); Charles Taylor,
Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 31 (Rajeev Bhargava, ed.,
1998); Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the American
Constitution, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 141 (Robert A.
Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987).
46
Political Liberalism at li-lii.
47
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in Collected Papers at 592.
48
Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (2002). The
convergence with Rawls is noted in Martha Nussbaum, Rawls’s Political
Liberalism: A Reassessment, 24 Ratio Juris 1, 16-19 (2011).
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rhetoric will have some disciplining effect: my views may be off
the wall, but I have a powerful interest in preventing them from
seeming so.
Jeffrey Stout argues that when Rawls proposes that social
unity be based on principles that no one could reasonably
reject, “he has drastically underestimated the range of things
that socially cooperative individuals can reasonably reject.” 49
The same burdens of judgment that make the doctrine of
reasonable pluralism plausible also suggest that we will not be
able to devise a social contract that fixes the terms of
cooperation in advance. Such a social contract would not be
accepted by all reasonable persons. (Michelman’s argument
builds on a similar point.) Moreover, it is not the only
possible basis of cooperation. Cooperation occurs whenever we
exchange reasons with one another. This can be done without
ever relying on universally acceptable premises. I can try to
take seriously the point of view that each of my fellow citizens
holds, addressing them one at a time. 50 My discourse inevitably
will often be secular, in that I will avoid reliance on
religious premises that I know my interlocutors do not accept. 51
But this is a response to a rhetorical imperative, not a moral
one. 52 Political discourse, in Stout’s vision, is exactly the
conflict of irreconcilable moral views, with no preexisting
common denominator, that Rawls fears. 53 Common ground, the basis
of Darwallian respect, gets constructed on an ad hoc basis with
each interlocutor, as one strives on each political occasion to
persuade a majority (at least) to support one’s proposal.
Constitutional discourse, which imagines a unitary community
that continues over generations and stands for some very
specific shared ideals, is a tool in that enterprise.
IV.
ELLIE [staring at her thoughtfully]. There's something odd
about this house, Hesione, and even about you. I don't know
49
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fire gets too hot.” Local Knowledge at 217.
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why I'm talking to you so calmly. I have a horrible fear
that my heart is broken, but that heartbreak is not like
what I thought it must be.
MRS HUSHABYE . . . It's only life educating you,
pettikins. 54
Balkin observes that the boundary between frivolous and
serious legal arguments is crucial to sustaining faith in the
rule of law. The lawyer who makes a frivolous argument “has
done more than make a mistake; he or she has disrespected a
crucial boundary that undergirds the system of legal faith and
faith in the legal system.” 55 If that boundary can be moved by
politics, “our faith in law might well be shaken.” 56
The faith that is shaken, however, is not in law so much as
in our fellow citizens, who are so deluded that they cannot see
when an argument is frivolous. We aim to live in respectful
relations with them, but their delusions do not inspire respect.
It is possible to have faith in, or at least to hope for, the
possibility that they will improve. 57 In the case of the
defenders of Bush v. Gore, however, I see no evidence that they
are capable of conversion. We never really believed in the same
things. Our marriage is a lie. And you shouldn’t marry someone
intending to change them.
Hilary Putnam, reflecting on the callous minimal-state
beliefs of his Harvard colleague Robert Nozick, observed that,
while he respected Nozick’s mind and character, “I feel contempt
(or something in that ballpark) for a certain complex of
emotions and judgments in him.” 58 There is, Putnam argued, “no
contradiction between having a fundamental liking and respect
for someone and still regarding something in him as an
intellectual and moral weakness.” 59 The proper stance is “an
ambivalent attitude of respectful contempt.” 60
Respectful contempt is what constitutional discourse is
nearly guaranteed to produce. Law is, of course, open-textured,
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and occasional disagreement about its content is inevitable. 61
In constitutional law, however, our readings of the texts tend
to be closely tied to our most urgent aspirations, so that
people with different aspirations will inevitably read the
constitution differently. Americans tend to merge the
Constitution with some of our deepest hopes for ourselves and
our society, and constitutional language is, in American
culture, a conventional way of communicating those hopes. If
those hopes imply a constitutional argument that is off-thewall, then we must do what we can to shift the cultural
boundaries of what is off-the-wall. 62 As Balkin observes, we
feel bound by the handiwork of the framers of the Constitution
because we in some way identify with them, and feel that their
accomplishments are ours. 63 This identification “is always
premised on an interpretation of and selective identification
with the past,” 64 as well as a distinctive imagination of “a
continuing political project that extends into the future.” 65
Originalism is a claim to base one’s argument of the moment on
continuity with that past. In that sense, everyone who makes
claims about American constitutional law is an originalist. But
this originalism is a rhetorical style, not an algorithm for
certainty in constitutional meaning.
This problem would go away if we would only demote the
Constitution to the status of ordinary law, which has nothing to
do with our transcendent aspirations. 66 If that happened,
originalism might be more plausible, 67 but it also wouldn’t
matter so much. We would be having a technical dispute about
the sources of law, of interest only to specialists. This
would, however, require a radical reimagining of the place of
the Constitution in American culture. It is unlikely to happen.
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And so long as it does not happen, the Constitution will be a
site of disrespect and betrayal.
We don’t have to be nasty about it. Rawls’s political
liberalism is first and foremost a response to a problem: "how
is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable
society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines?" 68 That’s a different question from how there can be
a society where everyone believes the same things. The practice
of sharing a social world with those who differ from us about
fundamentals is part of what social life is always about. As
the Putnam-Nozick relationship shows us, academics who worry
about the socially destructive power of intractable
disagreements routinely enjoy schmoozing with those whom they
regard as deeply misguided about morally weighty matters. 69 The
delicate combination of respect and contempt that Putnam
describes is the normal attitude of citizens toward one another
in a democracy. 70 Can’t we all just not get along?
We seek by persuasion to respectfully teach our fellow
citizens to be less contemptible. The modalities of
constitutional law are among the tools of persuasion. 71 The life
of constitutional law has not been logic, for there often are no
undisputed major premises from which to begin. It has been
rhetoric. The aim of the rhetoric is to bind our fragmented
polity together into what we can persuade ourselves is an
ancient unity. 72 Balkin observed long ago, here anticipating
Darwall, that transcendent ideals of justice “seem to spring
forth magically from the rhetorical encounter.” 73
My discussion so far has largely neglected the role of hope
in the constitutional narrative. 74 That narrative, we have seen,
is full of gaps and discontinuities, but gap-closing is
precisely what hope does. Jonathan Lear can even write of
“radical hope,” which is “directed toward a future goodness that
transcends the current ability to understand what it is.” 75 Hope
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is a universal sealant that can fill whatever cracks exist in
the structure of social solidarity. Charles Taylor observes:
“Hope can only exist if you are uncertain about a desired
outcome. If it’s really a sure thing, your anticipation of it
can’t be hope.” 76
Constitutional Protestantism, the construction of arguments
based on text and principle, “offers a way for individuals and
groups to pledge faith in the Constitution’s restoration and
redemption, even when judges and government officials do not
heed their views,” Balkin writes. “It holds out the hope of a
Constitution that will someday be redeemed.” 77 Hope can take the
place of a rule in the structure of Darwallian respect. It is
the Hobbesian sovereign. 78 If you betray me today, I can still
hope that your future self will learn to accept and conform to
the legitimate sources of authority that today you outrageously
refuse to acknowledge. 79 (I can even bring some interpretive
charity to your implausible interpretations. 80 As Aquinas noted,
faith and hope beget charity. 81)
When we tell competing histories, for example, about Bush
v. Gore, we aim to reconstitute what is or is not frivolous and
therefore contemptible. Justice Scalia, challenged about the
decision, offered the charming advice, “get over it.” 82 One
reason that it is hard to get over it is that, if this precedent
stands as legitimate, then the Court is authorized to do this
76
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kind of thing again. 83 The accepted national narrative
authorizes future actions. Unless the Court is properly shamed
for its bad behavior, it will be able to get away with anything.
Perhaps paradoxically, accusations of betrayal can be themselves
community-building. They police the boundaries of the frivolous
and aim at a new consensus with our unruly, unreliable,
contemptible fellow citizens. If we were indifferent to them
and their ridiculous beliefs, if we did not care, then indeed
constitutional law would be a more placid business.
Only love can break your heart. 84
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